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A b s t r a c t
The essay discusses the relationship between group identities 
(especially national) and the notion of territory and its symbolic 
significance in the creation of the idea of community. The au-
thor examines possible contexts that connect the frontiers of 
identity with the identities of national state borders, as well 
as ways in which these connections become symbolic, using 
the example of the recent plane crash tragedy in Smoleńsk. 
In the final part of the essay, the author refers to Leszek 
Kołakowski’s notion of myth in order to justify the thesis that 
each nation (also in the first decades of the 21th century) is 
always a mythical community that is being constantly reacti-
vated through current political and ideological actions.
K e y  w o r d s: frontier; nation; identity; myth; ideology; poli-
tics; memory
GranIce TożsamoścI  I  Tożsamość GranIc
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Artykuł omawia kwestie związków tożsamości zbiorowych, 
zwłaszcza narodowych, z pojęciem własnego terytorium 
i jego symbolicznego znaczenia dla budowania dla wyobrażeń 
wspólnotowych. Na przykładzie tragedii katastrofy samolotu 
pod Smoleńskiem autor artykułu pokazuje możliwe konteksty, 
w jakich tytułowe granice tożsamości wiążą się z tożsamością 
granic narodowego terytorium oraz w jaki sposób zaznacza się 
3symbolicznie ten nierozerwalny związek. W końcowej partii artykułu autor odwołuje się do koncepcji 
mitu Leszka Kołakowskiego, aby uzasadnić tezę, że każdy naród, także w pierwszych dekadach XXI 
wieku, jest zawsze wspólnotą mityczną, która nieustannie się reaktywuje również w kontekście dzia-
łań politycznych i ideologicznych.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: granica; naród; tożsamość; mit; ideologia; polityka; pamięć
I
In his essay “Soil, blood and identity” Zygmunt Bauman wrote: 
If the need of identity is universal in the human species burdened with its drive to sociability, 
its awareness, consciousness of its experience – as a need, as an end to be pursued, task to 
be fulfilled – is far from universal. That experience intensifies with the ferocity of contest (or, 
which amounts to the same, with the decrease in certainty). Competitive challenge makes 
any identity seem precarious; and the one comfort identity is expected to offer is self-confi-
dence, certainty, ‘knowing where one stands.’ One would expect, therefore, the search  for 
identity to be at its most intense when identity is not to be taken placidly, as a gift of blood 
and soil; when it appears instead fluid, pliable, located in the not-yet-accomplished future in-
stead of in the already-too-late-to-be-tinkered-with past. By and large, this is what happens at 
a time of rapid change – when new forms of life emerge too fast to be absorbed and domesti-
cated by the old mechanisms of control and ancient mental frames. […] Lifting identity to the 
level of awareness, making it into a task – and objective of self-reflexive activity, and object 
of, simultaneously, individual concern and specialized institutional service – is one of the most 
prominent characteristics of modern times (Bauman, 1992, pp. 679–680).
Even though in the next passage Bauman adds that „it is against this background that 
the phenomenon of nationalism can be best understood,” I am certain that his utterance 
retains a more general significance. Let us consider two concerns that appear in the frag-
ment quoted above. Firstly, “the need for identity” understood as a universal feature of 
humanity. This approach to identity is distinctive for philosophy and psychology, especial-
ly psychoanalysis (See: Wrong, 2000, pp. 10–14). When we think about metaphysics, it 
is always related to individual identity, to the explicit foundation of our adjudication of be-
ing, and hence to transcendental identity. In psychology, however, the aim is to establish 
astable identity, to achieve confidence that a person always remains himself regardless 
of the changes taking place through time; an individual who meets the psychological cri-
teria of “norm” admittedly must experience trouble with defining his or her own identity 
in different stages of life, but generally – under the threat of being classified with one of 
the many mental illnesses – contemplates himself or herself to be the same person.
The second issue, even more important in the context of this essay, is the problem of 
cultural identity. According to common conception as long as the state of the world can 
be characterized as stable, repetitive, and for that reason comfortingly predictable, the is-
sue of “problems with identity” does not appear. However, when things take a different 
turn, and the state of the world becomes unstable and changes begin to occur in a rapid 
pace, identity may show traces of confusion and uncertainty. Its primarily manifestation is 
the persistent questioning of who we are in this world, in this strange reality that seems 
harder and harder to grasp while we try to situate ourselves in it, still holding on to tradi-
tional criteria of belonging.
4Usual defensive reactions to these confusions of identity are conscious actions di-
rected at reestablishing the clarity of the criteria. A reoccurring pattern of every identity 
founded on ethnic and national criteria is its relationship to some “cultivated” land or 
territory. There is a general agreement that every culture is located in a particular space 
– it always belongs and comes from “somewhere.” Even the classic definition of cul-
ture formulated by Edward B. Tylor, which defines culture as a “complex whole” consist-
ing of such components as knowledge, religion, art, morality, law and customs, implicitly 
states that the way in which people live and give meaning to the world also depends 
on the awareness of their own distinctness from other “complex wholes” inhabited by 
territorially-limited communities. Tylor seems to be hinting that the boundaries of my cul-
ture are the boundaries of my world, and this thought in turn shapes the foundation of 
every nationalistic ideology whose indeclinable ambition is the creation of a group identity 
founded on the metonymical signs that define the relation between “us” and “our terri-
tory.” My world is a system of opinions and beliefs which I share with my countrymen, 
a homogenic and consistent entirety guaranteed by the mutual bonds and contacts we 
share within specific boundaries. 
The relationship between an image of a place and the creation of cultural identity is 
also a central issue for traditional, conventional theories of culture. As Nestor Garcia Can-
clini writes: 
To have an identity meant, above all – to have a country, a city, neighborhood; a separate 
whole within which everything is common for those inhabiting this place. Those who did not 
share our territory, who did not possess the same objects and symbols, rituals and customs, 
were different – they were those alien (Canclini, 1993, p. 13). 
Culture demands distinctions, the division of people and things; culture is not a natu-
ral order, but one that is shaped with intention. In each of these environments there are 
boundaries that connect certain people and at the same time eliminate others, or at least 
indicate which boundaries should not be crossed. It is also the boundary between “in-
groups” and “out-groups.” Zygmunt Bauman and Tim May wrote: 
[…] an out-group is precisely that imaginary opposition to itself that the in-group needs for 
self-identity, for its cohesiveness, for its inner solidarity and emotional security. A readiness 
to cooperate within the confines of the group thereby requires, as its prop, a refusal to coop-
erate with an adversary. It is as if we needed the fear of wilderness in order to feel security 
(Bauman & May, 2001, p. 31).
Regardless of the different transformations happening in the world, the taxonomies 
that define membership to a cultural group still function on the basis of central and 
essential features. Under the pressure of the European positive valorization of prop-
erty (anthropologists having had their share of influence) today it is demanded of us 
to “posses” culture in the same way as we “posses” a permanent address. Herzfeld 
notices that people without nationality have become the new “accursed people of the 
land,” since they have been classified as people suspended beyond social existence. 
Indeed, we may experience these dilemmas most fully realized in cities and on bor-
der crossings, respectively, in spatial loops and materialized breakpoints of taxonomies. 
Both of these spaces are treated as contaminated, impure, unregulated, distant – in 
other words –  create a predictably understandable system of “our” and “other” (see: 
Herzfeld, 2001).
5II
The discourse centered around the concept of nation provides a model that explains what 
it means to have an identity and to belong to a territory. Indeed it is fascinating to observe 
how it is adapted by people who in the end find themselves excluded by their own na-
tionalist validations. In the conditions of a national state the fear of others (heterophobia), 
thoroughly examined by anthropologists, corresponds to xenophobia. It is the source of the 
settled populations’ attitude to the different types of migrants: immigrants, re-emigrants, 
refugees, as well as temporary newcomers who may permanently join the group which 
has a tendency for treating itself as a kinship community. Georg Simmel wrote many years 
ago that the act of travelling signifies an absence of relations with any point in space, a con-
dition completely different to the feeling of permanent attachment to a particular place. The 
notion of otherness is a synthesis of the terms “travelling” and “attachment,” since the 
phenomenon behind it reveals, on the one hand, a condition, and on the other, is a symbol 
of the attitude to a person (Simmel, 2006, p. 204). In terms of definition, a traveler does not 
belong to any established circle of “homeliness,” he brings qualities that are not and can-
not be indigenous to this circle. The problem lies in the fact that in our contemporary wold 
not only people are moving, but so are their identities, and their shaped is determined by 
other conditions than territory. Group and territorial identifications have a grand rival – elec-
tronic media which give inducement to the search for imagined identities, in some measure 
even crossing the traditional connection with a particular place and in-group.
Contrary to what Zygmunt Bauman is suggesting, that which is directed towards the 
past does not have to be more safe or more unambiguous. The changes happening “here 
and now” also reflect on our hitherto vision of the past, e.g. national. They are no longer 
perceived as comforting, but also undergo revision, since that is the cost of confronting 
modernity: political, demographic, media, etc. Today we experience this in Poland after 
the tragedy in Smoleńsk, therefore a little more should be said on this subject.
The events that happened in Smoleńsk on the 10th of April 2010, and the subsequent 
eruption of the symbolically-mythologizing rhetoric that we can observe in different cir-
cles of the Polish society force us to critically consider the commonly accepted thesis 
that we are living in a post-ideological and post-political time. I dare to doubt it, especially 
if we choose to contemplate the issues of national identity and its social hermeneutics. In 
order to explain this thesis, we must turn our attention to a landmark anthropological text 
written by the exquisite anthropologist Clifford Geertz. 
In his essay Geertz notices that our problems with the notion of ideology, best express-
es – as he himself has called it – in the Mannheim paradox – can be reduced to the fact
that the social sciences have not yet developed a genuinely nonevaluative conception of ideol-
ogy […] Bluntly, we need a more exact apprehension of our object of study, lest we find our-
selves in the position of the Javanese folk-tale figure, ‘Stupid Boy,’ who, having been coun-
seled by his mother to seek a quiet wife, returned with a corpse (Geertz, 1973, p. 196).
I am convinced that in our times a similar way of “silencing” a problem is the adoption 
of the thesis that we live in post-ideological times (the corpse of the ideology), and the is-
sue is much more complicated, as ideology has not disappeared but only moved from the 
openly political sphere to the cultural and symbolic sphere, connected with group identity 
and the concept of value – exempla virtutis of the nation for which territoriality places a 
crucial role.
6Geertz arranges the various concepts of ideology in his own style, narrowing them 
down to two categories: the interest theory and the strain theory: 
For the first, ideology is a mask and a weapon; for the second, a symptom and a remedy. In 
the interest theory, ideological pronouncements are seen against the background of a univer-
sal struggle for advantage; in the strain theory, against the background of a chronic effort to 
correct sociophychological disequilibrium. In the one, men pursue power; in the other, they 
flee anxiety. As they may, of course, do both at the same time – and even one by means of 
the other – the two theories are not necessarily contradictory; but the strain theory (which 
arose in response to the empirical difficulties encountered by the interest theory), being less 
simplistic, is more penetrating, less concrete, more comprehensive (Geertz, 1973, p. 201).
Marxist tradition has developed the interest theory to perfection, and it is still “in use” 
and has its faithful followers. As Geertz notes: 
The great advantage of interest theory was and is its rooting of cultural idea-systems in the 
solid ground of social structure, through emphasis on the motivations of those who profess 
such systems and on the dependence of those motivations in turn upon social position, most 
especially social class. Further, the interest theory welded political speculation to political 
combat by pointing out that ideas are weapons and that an excellent way to institutionalize 
a particular view of reality – that of one’s group, class, or party – is to capture political power 
and enforce it” (Geertz, 1973, p. 202). 
Today this theory has been utterly compromised and accused of being too primitive to 
illustrate the complex interactions taking place among social, psychological and cultural 
factors.
The strain theory considers that the integration of society is being permanently ob-
structed, and no social arrangement is reliable when dealing with problems that inevitably 
appear during its functioning. Each arrangement is full of antinomies: between freedom 
and political order, stability and change, efficiency and humanity, precision and flexibility; 
between the different sectors of society – economics, political system, family. Such fric-
tions also appear on the level of individual personality. In this view ideology is a symbolic 
outlet for emotional anxieties caused by the disorder of social balance.
There are different ways to explain the mechanisms behind tensions and anxieties 
experienced by the society. We have the cathartic explanation, in which the emotional 
tension is diffused through displacement into symbolic enemies (“The Jews,” “Busi-
nessmen,” “The Russians,” etc.). There is the morale explanation, according to which 
ideology has the ability to keep individuals and groups in a situation of chronic strain, or to 
unambiguously contradict its existence, or to legitimate it in the name of some higher val-
ues. The solidarity explanation states that ideology allows to merge groups on the sym-
bolic level. And, last but not least, we have the advocatory explanation, where the power 
of ideology and ideologists comes down to the articulation of tensions which force them 
to act. As a result these issues are noticed by the public opinion (Geertz, 1973, pp. 204–
205). We can observe each of these explanations being used in Poland, sometimes even 
in a synthesized form. The tragedy in Smoleńsk confronted the reality of a nation as not 
only an imagined community, but one that experiences a loss of stability and searches for 
perfectly-recognizable symbols and signs. 
According to Geertz – who scrupulously analyzes the weak points of these ideologies 
and their explanation – the existing traditions of framing ideology have steered clear of 
one basic issue: the process of symbolic formulation, the functioning of symbols and 
transmission of meanings. There is absence of an analytical framework when it comes 
7to dealing with the figurative language of ideology. As a result, most explanations formu-
lated in the fields of political sciences and sociology perceive ideology as nothing more 
than set of sophisticated cries of pain. Not knowing the functions of metaphor, analogy, 
irony, ambiguity, wordplay, paradox, hyperbole, rhythm and other elements that consti-
tute “style,” social researchers have no access to the symbolical resources that can be 
used in more sophisticated formulations. 
What do we mean, therefore, when we say that after the tragedy in Smoleńsk so-
cio-psychological tensions are expressed primarily through symbolic forms? Let us once 
again turn to the assistance of the master of interpretative anthropology, transferring his 
insights into our modern conditions. Geertz writes that symbols can be used like a map 
that enables people, especially those facing collective tragedies, to transform physical 
experiences into emotions and attitudes that permit us not to react to such tragedies 
blindly, but intelligently! He writes: 
The central rituals of religion – a mass, a pilgrimage, a corroboree – are symbolic models (here 
more in the form of activities than words) of a particular sense of the divine, a certain sort of 
devotional mood, which their continual re-enactment tends to produce in their participants 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 216). 
We can definitely expand this list by adding other types of rituals that took place in 
front of the Presidential Palace during those tumultuous weeks, on the procession route, 
in churches, squares, etc.
In the case of ideology “cognition” and “expression” do not form a dichotomy, simi-
larly as cognitive and expressive symbols are also a source of information that can be 
used to shape one’s patterns of life. Symbols allow us to perceive, understand, assess 
and manipulate the world. Given that ideologies are culturally constructed, they are in 
fact schematic images of a social order, and through them a person transforms himself or 
herself into a political animal. To conclude: 
Whatever else ideologies may be – projections of unacknowledged facts, disguises for ulterior 
motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity – they are, most distinctively, maps of problem-
atic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (Geertz, 1973, p. 220).
The renaissance of national symbols is a fact. It is nonetheless interesting that the 
statement being repeated like a mantra – that today the nation is uniting on a symbolic 
level, in some measure reconstructing its own heritage and constantly recalling its signifi-
cance – as well as the appeals to strengthen collective identity, both refer to a strangely 
rehabilitated notion of myth. It is said, then, that we are experiencing a “new founding 
myth,” “the myth of Katyń,” a myth of union etc., without ever answering the important 
question: does it really indicate a return of cultural ideology, or – as I have stated previ-
ously – a temptation of ideology? Indeed, a myth cannot be constructed. The creation 
of a collective sense of suffering, references to a national sacrifice and death that have 
always characterized Poles, and are now being restored with the additional context of 
the “cursed Katyń,” is not a founding myth. It is a collective ideology, a reference to the 
“national conscience.” A myth always comes from nowhere, it cannot be constructed. 
It is shaped spontaneously. Furthermore, it always holds a uniting effect, deriving cer-
tainty and sense of meaning from the fact of collective identification with specific values. 
The ideology that is returning today, on a grand scale, has an antagonizing character, as 
it is not shared by everyone but on the contrary, it divides society into those who – also 
metonymically – adhere to a particular vision of a world filled with symbols and signs car-
8rying almost religious connotations, and those who are denied this right, or at least their 
right is questioned and they are forced to make some kind of explanation. Not everyone 
agrees with the recurring belief that in times of tragedy Poles turns to religion, not seeing 
any significant difference between a state-secular and religious-sacral celebration of na-
tional grief. The state has once again merged with Catholicism, surrendering in a moment 
when it was allegedly still strong… 
Everything that is happening in the public space, in media and on the streets of Polish 
cities (especially in the one of the country’s many symbolic centers, the Presidential Palace) 
demonstrates a specific helplessness of interpreters dealing with the here and now. And 
yet the antagonism between different visions of Poland resembles a cultural war, under-
stood as an unresolved conflict over values. Chantal Mouffe has rightly noticed that the 
theory of democracy proves useless in some circumstances, e.g. when the articulations of 
collective conscience are being symbolically concentrated. It is characterized by a “blind-
ness” to antagonism. This happens because “an idealized view of human sociability, as be-
ing essentially moved by empathy and reciprocity, has generally provided the basis of mod-
ern democratic political thinking. Violence and hostility are seen as archaic phenomenon, to 
be eliminated thanks to the progress of exchange and the establishment, through a social 
contract of a transparent communication among rational participants” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 3).
Cultural anthropology adopts a more ambivalent approach to human sociability, show-
ing that reciprocity and hostility complement and condition each other. Mouffe follows 
this path and argues that in today’s world both the political and cultural ideology play out 
in the moral register. The division between “us” and “them” is still perfectly functional, 
although it is no longer defined with the use of political categories (hence the term post-
politics), but in moral terms: “In place of a struggle between ‘right and left’ we are faced 
with a struggle between ‘right and wrong’” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 5). Nothing illustrates this 
better than the antagonism induced by the Smolensk trauma which became a source for 
an enticing ideology that in essence represents another face of Polish nationalism. The 
ideological discourse that would indeed be an interesting subject of a closer examina-
tion (also from the perspective of figurative language) focuses on several major nodal 
points, as a result of which ideology tends to articulate itself in the plane of expression, 
through emotions. This type of ideology is governed by the logic of equivalence according 
to which the world becomes divided into two camps – “our” (patriotic) and “their.” This 
way the right-wing and conservative appropriation of the symbolic national space reaches 
the highest point of division and separation. In one value system essentially everything 
stands in opposition to elements from the other system. Hence the growing feeling that 
there is not one but two different Polish societies. Only one segment of the population 
(described in different terms, but always connoting “rightfulness”) claims the right to ap-
point these nodal points of national identity. Today this part of the society is granted the 
voice to speak, and the ideological definition of the symbolical fundaments of the nation 
are being restored in their name. 
III
Stuart Hall is correct when he observes that in today’s world we can pick many different 
identities, and the constant balancing between the possibilities they create has become an 
element of everyday experience (Hall, 1996, pp. 4–10). Identity turns into a “challenge,” 
9something in the process of constant creation and becoming. Questions about the spa-
tial location of an individual reinforce the feeling of anxiety, all the more with the media’s 
significant influence on the horizon of our imagination (see: Appadurai, 1996). This relates 
both to those who build their individual identity while being firmly embedded in the reali-
ties of liberal democracy, as well as to those who are rooted, for good and for bad, in their 
own locality (which becomes less and less tight), who observe the images of the world 
(which do not come from “nowhere”) to which they are indeed invited to, although this 
world disappears at the same time as the image. That expanded reality never escapes 
them entirely, however, since its characteristic features infiltrate the ways of perceiving 
their own community, nation, family model, and even the self-esteem and consistency of 
an individual’s identity. An open and silent battle takes place over which of these identities 
is legitimate: either those that are based on territory or those on individual choice, a result 
of one’s autonomy. It is a battle between territorial and deterritorialized identities.
The deterritorialization of identity refers to an increasingly common state when an indi-
vidual feels that he belongs to different communities regardless of the fact that they are 
not in any way connected through any mutual territory. It also refers to the new situation 
in which national and regional cultures are no longer considered a source or foundation 
for a consistent and distinct identity. To some extent these cultures experience the same 
fate as the notion of culture was exposed to in the past, no longer understood as an au-
tonomic and totalizing entity. The term was first used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
to describe a moment of linguistic alienation resulting from a lack of attachment. Franz 
Kafka represents an archetypical figure of a deterritorializated and nomadic linguistic self-
consciousness. The way he uses languages serves to “express a different potential com-
munity, is a search for a different type of awareness and sensitivity (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1986, p. 17). Speaking in more broad terms, the term “deterritorialization” refers to sec-
ond-rate, minor, “minority” literature, although not in the sense of its status, but the criti-
cal stance it shares towards the canon of literature and the subversive nature of its use of 
the dominant language. According to the two authors, the rule of deterritorialization, in its 
most generalized sense, is defined as: 
Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the 
other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth. [...] It merges 
with the movement of those who leave their territory en masse, with crayfish that set off walk-
ing in file at the bottom of the water, with pilgrims or knights who ride a celestial line of flight. 
The earth is not one element among others but rather brings together all the elements within 
a single embrace while using one or another of them to deterritorialize territory. Movements of 
deterritorialization are inseparable from territories that open onto an elsewhere; and the proc-
ess of reterritorialization is inseparable from the earth, which restores territories. Territory and 
earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility – deterritorialization (from territory 
to the earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to territory) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 86). 
Deterritorialization should not be seen as a romantic gesture of spiritual and physical 
exclusion from the world, or a cosmopolitan lack of rootedness. The homeland of philoso-
phy is always unknown, lost or forgotten, leaving the philosopher is a state of deterritori-
alization; only through the process of critical thinking may he attempt an act of re-territo-
rialization. The latter is never complete or final, on the contrary, it is rather a never-ending 
oscillation between different states and characters of awareness. The act of searching for 
a territory implies prior deterritorialization and one’s own re-territorialization in the sphere 
of myths, dreams, images of earth and objects. This type of thinking is not linear. It rather 
resembles a loop, an entanglement with contradictions and aporias.  
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The concept introduced by Deleuze and Guattari seems to be a useful instrument that 
can help to understand the cracks and scratches of language and cultural identity, espe-
cially for those who – like Kafka and Rushdie – live in imaginary homelands (of words), or 
– like exiles, aliens, migrants and individuals sans papiere – will never be completely chez 
sui. In the dimension of culture globalization “produces” millions of analogous subjects, 
a problem analyzed in length by Arjun Appadurai. Contrary to common beliefs about the 
relationship existing between culture, space and identity, they cope with the situation in 
which these three, allegedly inseparable, dimensions of existence have been dispersed. 
Identities that are “beyond territory” are a great challenge for territorial thinking, since 
they believe that race, nationality, religion, language, as well as gender have a much larg-
er impact on human life than the place of residence. In other words, the autonomy of 
diversity stands in contradiction to homogeneity that is presupposed by the notion of cul-
ture and territorial power (see: Donnan & Wilson, 1994; Papastergiadis, 2000).
From an anthropological perspective this vision of a nation is a classical example of 
mythological thinking. Its axis is not a reference to the rational argumentation and careful 
historical examination, but the rule of a metonymical contiguity to an area that is consid-
ered to be a kind of ontological being without any precedence. Nationalism can be under-
stood as an attempt to position oneself in an existing and unconditionally experienced 
order of values. Antonina Kłoskowska has noticed that symbolic culture still remains the 
sphere that most strongly differentiates national cultures, their specific “syntagma.” Na-
tional culture can be seen as a complex “expression,” a syntagma in the sense that the 
connections between distinct elements of this “national expression” define the syntag-
matic axis. Its elements consist of different systems: art, customs, religion, literature, his-
torical reflection or politics. As a consequence – writes Kłoskowska – national identity can 
be defined as “a sum of national culture texts, its symbols and values that construct the 
universe of a culture, creating its syntagma, especially its canonical core” (Kłoskowska, 
1996, p. 100).
IV
We should once again return to the words of Leszek Kołakowski, who described “myth 
as a desire to move beyond ourselves into an order in which I treat myself as a sub-
ject possessing a limited range of possibilities, as a thing, as something that fills a space 
in a construction that is built, even if virtually, by myself. […] A myth can be accepted 
as far as a single glance becomes a type of coercion that enslaves the whole commu-
nity, no matter whether it is global or tribal” (Kołakowski, 1994, pp. 25–26). Therefore, 
if we consider the idea of nation as a value-creating myth – after all, nationalists refer 
to it as a “natural” historical necessity – it becomes clear that this mythological image 
imposes a strict formula that grounds the historical community in an ahistorical (and thus 
unconditional) situation. The worlds of values are a mythical reality, even more so in the 
case of national exempla virtutis.
It then becomes apparent where this specific feeling of obligation comes from – per-
sistently emphasized by the nationalistic and patriotic thought – or an awareness that we 
are in debt with the nation, and that the nation requires sacrifices, that every member of 
the national community should support each other, creating a genuine bond of genuine 
assistance between the participants of this debt. Furthermore, referring to the nation as 
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an unquestionable existence also expresses the conviction that social history is not re-
duced only to – as I have written earlier – the discourse of transformation, but most of all 
it is an accumulation of things from the past which are preserved in what comes after; 
that facts are not only facts, but little bricks creating this world of values that can be sal-
vaged regardless of the irreversible events.
As a result, we “adhere” to the national community as if it was some territory of the 
world of values; we do not belong to a nation metaphorically, although the idea of a na-
tion indeed has metaphorical character. On the contrary, we are part of it in tangible and 
physical terms – a testimony that proves we known the symbolic universe which consti-
tutes its various elements.
Nationalism is thus primarily a specific figure of thought (as well as a linguistic trope) 
that is based mostly on metonymical associations. If we refer to the way metonymy is 
understood in contemporary cognitive linguistics and adapt its elements to the prob-
lems under consideration it his essay, we can state that the idea of nation most certain-
ly belongs to a set of idealized mental (cognitive) models (see: Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; 
Kövecses, 2002). The domain we define as “nation” consists of various elements that 
remain in a close metonymical proximity, and are exchangeable as they fit into this 
more general domain, in addition to the fact that each one symbolizes an entirety un-
derstood in axiological terms. Contrary to metaphor, the main purpose of metonymy 
is not to serve cognitive objectives but to provide mental access to a more abstract 
idea (domain, institution etc.). Each of these concepts – territory, family, the sons and 
mothers of the homeland, heraldic, national flag, memorials, even the decision to write 
“Polish Nation” in capital letters – belongs to a metonymical construct identified as 
“nation,” in this instance a specific nation, although this principle has a much more 
general value. As an idealized mental model “the nation” can be “harmed” in many dif-
ferent ways, although in the end it always comes down to violating the status of one of 
its components.
Each metonymy consequently gives substance to a more general notion and helps us 
to see it more clearly. It serves the role of a designative function that allows to use a cer-
tain notion (e.g. “matka-polka”) in such a way as to replace another (e.g. Nation). Meton-
ymy also permits us to reach a better understanding of the desired vision of a nation, and 
to understand the subjects that form the national community. It enables us to distinguish 
different parts that can represent the whole, while our decision to focus on a chosen one 
is always conditioned by a previous choice – the sphere which we focus our attention 
on. In a systematic way metonymical notions organize our thinking about the idea of na-
tion. As and Johnson convincingly demonstrate, the linguistic systems of cultures and 
religions are in fact metaphorical, and symbolic metonymies “are the essential link that 
connects everyday experience with a coherent metaphorical system that characterizes 
religions and cultures” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 63). 
When considered a myth, the idea of nation is never safe, since in myths everything 
exists „forever,” and „since forever.” Historical arguments have little significance, as 
the mythical awareness characterizing the essence of the nation lies stretched over and 
beside them. A nation is indeed a community proven by linear history as well as myth. In 
the second dimension – on the mythological plane – an important role in keeping some 
of these ideas alive is played by a category of people I propose to call contemporary 
version of mages. I am thinking specifically about particular depositaries of an “ultimate 
truth,” modern demiurges laying claim to ways the world is shaped. They are perfect 
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examples demonstrating the works of mythical mechanisms that return us to some 
primal unconditional state, a process which I have described above with reference to 
Kołakowski’s thoughts.
In his book The social role of the man of knowledge Florian Znaniecki described a cat-
egory of people which he called “sages,” competent guides specializing in the problems 
of cultural order. Many of the elements brought up by Znaniecki perfectly fit the category 
of mages. Therefore: first of all, a duty of a “sage” is to “prove” with the use of “scien-
tific” argumentation that the side which he chose in fact has access to the ultimate truth. 
It shows that existing institutions – religion, political structure, law, economy, customs, 
literature and art, system of education etc. – are wrong, since they represent signs of an 
older system of meaning. In the moment when the new order is decreed and takes ef-
fect, but somewhere on its margins the rudiments of the older order still exist, the role 
of sages-mages is to successively justify the superiority of the new order. The language 
they use must always refer to its magical source, since this additional creative value ena-
bles it to gain an advantage over the “normal” language that often does not claim any 
influence on the course of events. The language of mages seeks to “clamor down” and 
cover the competitive order: slogans and spells replace logical arguments. 
The method applied by mages is universal and can be reduced to combining two sepa-
rate systems of thinking. The truth becomes identified with everything good (for an in-
dividual and society or an individual and a nation), falsehood corresponds to everything 
which is wrong (e.g. the liberal concept of personal freedom and its complete autonomy 
that means “the absence of roots”). If the new order is good, truth becomes its immuta-
ble attribute, both the truth that is discovered as well as the truth that is constantly cre-
ated anew and remembered in the form of a litany. It requires protection from attempts 
undertaken by worshippers of the older order, who try to interfere with it regardless of 
the fact that they have not mastered the truth. We must remember that a demiurge of 
words does not have to prove anything – the justification is included a priori in the mythi-
cal foundations of the world. Znaniecki wrote the following: „The future order is to in-
clude values which find no place in the old order and to satisfy tendencies which hitherto 
remained unsatisfied, but these values and tendencies must be justified by the ideal. […] 
The future communist society requires new values in every field of culture and a working 
class morally purified of all the defects shown by the lumpenproletariat as well as by the 
passive servants of capitalistic paternalism and imbued instead by a new type of solidar-
ity” (Znaniecki, 1986, pp. 76–77). For Znaniecki this “justifiable ideal” means myth, one 
that is directed towards the future, or, we could say, a designing myth. This is the reason 
why “heroic” communism was so invested in mages of words: it sought to create a to-
talizing vision of the world that would infiltrate even the smallest element of social and 
individual existence.
In terms of the linguistic interpretation of the world, the history of communism can be 
divided into three stages. In the beginning, similarly as in the old cosmogonies, there was 
the Word which had the power to create a new world and destroy the old one. It was 
followed by Key-words, Spell-words that establish the cult of the New Era. Encasing real-
ity with words such as “socialism,” “wealth,” “work competition,” “the party,” “leader 
of the nation,” “working class”, etc. at the same time meant that reality would remain 
concealed in this particular, magical sense. In the end there was also the Word, a Cliché-
word that perfectly captured the powerless of language and the inevitable dispersion of 
mythology as it was no longer sustained by any worldview.
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The fall of communism can be seen as a process of dissociation of human conscious-
ness which is suddenly exposed to rivaling versions of the future world order. As long 
as the slowly collapsing system is formally still reigning, the liberating thought opposes 
it with a competitive system, however, at that point his system is presented only in its 
idealized form. That is why this historical moment brings to life and is “sustained” by the 
words of the mages of democracy, who – whether they want it or not – create its myth. 
In this context the idea of “democratic Poland” does not have to necessary hold any de-
scriptive value. To be more precise, it should be a value, a spell, the first word of the new 
order looming on the horizon. The process of „transforming” into democracy is a return 
to the normal state of things, the final ending of semantic misuses – words and their sub-
jective references become separated once and for all. In other words, it is a triumph of 
logos over the forces of mythos.
Many years ago Roger Caillois already pointed to the illusionary contradiction existing 
between totalitarianism (of every color) and democracy. He stated that the charismatic 
rule that characterizes every totalitarian state “is not only compatible with the conditions 
of modern political life, but even finds a particularly favorable foundation for further de-
velopment, as long as it will be used accordingly” (Caillois, 1973, p. 290). One of these 
possibilities is born every time different visions of organizing democracy are brought out 
to the light. The final argument can be reduced to a choice of competitive myths. And 
a myth well-grounded in human psyche indeed actualizes certain archetypes, thus be-
coming a figure of thought that translates into rhetorical figures through language.
The contemporary world – a world in which Poland has had more than twenty years 
of experience with democracy – is a manifestation of the constant process of reactivating 
the mythical and ideological (in Geertz’s sense) imagination that is deeply rooted in po-
litical, moral and cultural models of the world after communism. Seen from an anthropo-
logical perspective, Polish political life seems to be constructed on successive departures 
and returns to different mythologies. One thing never changes – the Past Myth is always 
struggling with the Future Myth.
Translated by 
jędrzej Burszta
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